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Welfare-Theoretical Analyses of the Brain Drain
This paper reviews the literature on the theoretical analysis of
the welfare effects of the brain drain. The different theoretical analyses,
with their occasionally divergent conclusions, can be illuminatingly
classified according to whether: (i) they deal with comparative-static
or dynamic formulations;
(ii) they assume a perfectly competitive model or one with endogenous
market or policy-imposed distortions; and
(iii) they address themselves to the welfare of the country of
emigration or of immigration, or take a world-welfare viewpoint.
In the following review, we begin (Section I) briefly with a discussion
of the last set of issues distinguished above: namely, whose welfare
should be considered and how welfare should be defined. We next turn,
in Section II, to the early, theoretical literature which has focussed
on comparative-static analyses in perfectly competitive models. In
Section III, we turn to analyses which allow for distortions: policy-
imposed (e.g. educational subsidies) and endogenous (e.g. rigid or sticky
real wages). Finally, in Section IV, we review the d>Tiamic analyses of
the effects of the brain drain.*
In reviewing the literature, we naturally synthesise and marginally
extend it. Also, we provide an analytical taxonomy into which the theoretical
* We should enter the caveat explicitly that our review, by no means, is
exhaustive but touches rather on what appear to us to be interesting
contributions from the viewpoint of our focus in this paper. Furthermore,
we confine ourselves to explicitly theoretical analyses, using formal
models in one way or another: hence we do not review early writings of
interest such as Harry Johnson's (1965) Minerva article on the Canadian
brain drain.
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contributions in this volume can be, and are, appropriately fitted and
hence their relationship to the foregoing contributions and to one another
is more readily assesssed by the reader.
I: Welfare: Whose and How Defined
A: A central problem in the analysis of migration relates to the
question: whose welfare is being assessed? Even if we assume away inter-
generational welfare problems (such as those raised by John Rawls (1971)
recently), the modern migration of skilled personnel raises in an acute
form the question as to whether the welfare of these migrants is to be
considered part of the welfare of the LDC (or, for that matter, as in a
recent UNCTAD study (1974), part of the welfare of the DC).
If migration were permanent, so that the immigrant could be taken
to have left the LDC and arrived in the DC on a for-ever basis, then it
would make some sense to consider the question as to what has happened to
"LDC welfare" as identical to the question as to what has happened to
the "welfare of those left behind in the LDC". However, skilled (PTK
in U.S. tmmig.ration terminology: Professional, Technical and Kindred)
migrants today— including those who take permanent-residence visas in the
DC of immigration and are immigrants in the juridical sense as also in
popular parlance— typically move to and fro between the LDC of origin and
the DC of destination (and indeed, en route , to other DCs and LDC ' s
at times). Hence, PTK immigrants are not really permanent migrants in
many cases.
However, even in the case of permanent, for-ever migrants, it is
not entirely clear that they should be excluded altogether from the definition
of "LDC welfare". Skilled immigrants today enjoy low transport costs
which permit frequent returns to the LDC's of origin and hence retention
of LDC loyalties and affiliations. Their job opportunities also now tend
to cut across different DC's, increasing their capacity to resist the
assimilative pressures of the DC in which they reside—a passionate iimnigrant
into the UK, who will not adapt to British phlegm, may be able to migrate
to the back-slapping friendliness of the USA or to a convex combination
of the two cultures in Canada. The identification with the DC of destination
is not quite so inevitable in consequence. Furthermore, the melting pot
now has itself melted in the USA, the principal DC of •immigration: ethnic
diversity is encouraged and Dr. Kissinger finds his realpolitik hamstrung
by ethnic groups whose political and emotional affiliation to countries
of emigration is considered a thoroughly acceptable part of the domestic,
political process.
Thus, several factors have combined to make continuing link to LDC's
of origin and failure to fuse into DC's of destination important aspects
of modem, PTK migration from LDC's to DC's. This observation, plus the
fact of extensive "to-and-fro" migration, make it somewhat implausible
to assert that, if one is interested in LDC-welfare, one must exclude the
welfare of the migrants from the analysis. Identically, any procedure
which defines "DC welfare" as inclusive of the PTK immigrants' welfare
runs into the same difficulties plus the additional fact that, despite
the selective regulation of immigration in the national interest by the
legislative and executive branches of DC governments, the average citizen
of DC is more likely to regard the immigrant's welfare as a "favour"
to the immigrant at the DC-citizens' "expense" than as an augmentation
of DC welfare!
It is best therefore to analyse the welfare issues separately for
three groups: (i) LDC nonemigrants; (ii) migrants; and (ill) DC non-
immigrants. Then, depending on what is appropriate for the analysis of
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any specific situation, one can add together any of the three components
to arrive at what is considered to be "LDC welfare" or "DC welfare":
clearly, no general rules will apply to all situations.
Among the other implications of to-and-fro migration by migrants,
we might also note one consequence of some analytical interest. While
the theoretical models to be reviewed presently allow for migration from
the LDC to the DC in the context of a variety of models of the LDC, none
of them allow for the "return of the native". Once the return migration
is allowed for, one can open up interesting possibilities for theoretical
analysis: the modelling of the DC, implying possible learning effects
for the (temporary) migrant, for example, could become relevant so that
the two-way migration relates to the same (physical) migrant but implies
unequal flows in the two directions from the viewpoint of welfare analysis.
A 2-period analysis of the welfare impact of such to-and-fro migration
would then be called for and would involve the effect of changing locations
on the efficiency and wealth of the migrant in an essential way.
B: Next, we ought to distinguish explicitly between the conventional
economist's objective function which admits only goods and services and
augmented objective functions which allow "noneconomic" arguments in the
objective function as in the analysis of optimal policy intervention to
achieve noneconomic objectives in Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969).
The explicitly theoretical literature to be presently reviewed is
exclusively focused on the conventional objective function. However,
the fact that societies may value the presence of technical personnel
per se in the interest of modernization or the possibly associated increase
in the size of the "modern", industrial sector's activity level is ~anifesrl}
an important aspect of societal concerns and the economist evaluating the
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welfare effects of the brain drain must come to terms with these traditionally
political, sociological, "noneconomic" objectives. This is indeed what
McCulloch and Yellen (1975) do when they discuss the possible "demoderniza-
tion" effect of an emigration tax in their model of the brain drain at the
Bellagio conference,
C^: At a different level, the economic analyst may not be able to con-
tinue using a well-ordered social utility function because there are no
fiscal policy instruments by which incomes can be redistributed in the
desired manner. In this event, explicit attention to the (actual) income
distributions before and after migration is required for welfare analysis.
Thus, in Hamada's (1975) Bellagio contribution, incomes can be redistributed
but, in the absence of lump-sum taxation as a feasible alternative, only
via the income tax: hence income distribution and per capita income levels
are both to be analyzed for examining the welfare conseq.uences of emigration.
D^: Similarly, if we depart from the assumption of full employment of
factors of production, then the effect of emigration on the unemployment
levels (or rates) could well be an additional, "economic" argument in
the objective function: as is done in the Bhagwati-Hamada (197A) paper.
E^: Finally, we may note that dynamic welfare analyses would necessarily
take the theorist into intertemporal optimization: and, in this case (as
is evident from our detailed analysis in Section IV), the welfare presumptions
established from static, welfare analysis do not necessarily carry over.
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II: Static, Welfare Theorising Without Distortions
The focus of most theoretical analyses has been on LDC nonemigrants'
welfare, using comparative statics and models without distortions, and
assuming permanent migration. These contributions can be reviewed in
ascending order of complexity.
Model 1 : One-Product, One-Factor-Emlgratlon Model
The simplest neoclassical model which has been used for analysing
the impact of migration on the welfare of the LDC nonemigrants Is the
one-product model with just one factor (labour) migrating at the margin
in a closed economy.
In this model, used by Grubel and Scott (1966) , it was argued correctly
that, for infinitesimal changes, the emigrant will neither harm nor help
the nonemigrants: the emigrant will have been contributing his marginal
product to national Income and earning it as well, so that his presence
or absence is Irrelevant to the nonemigrants' welfare. To put It graphically,
the emigrant will be merely sailing away with his own marginal product.
However, for finite changes, as was noted by Berry and Sollgo (1969)
and later independently by Tobin (1974), there is the familiar "surplus"
that the nonemigrants lose. This is seen readily in Figure 1 where the
marginal product of labour (MPL) cur^e is drawn, falling as a consequence
of the usual concave production function. The finite emigration of FG
amount of labour then results in a loss of surplus of the shaded area CDE.
Note one more point that is sometimes the source of critical confusion.
If we draw in an average product of labour (APL) schedule, it is clear
7a-
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that, for both infinitesimal and finite changes, the per capita Income
of the economy will rise (from KG to JF in Figure 1) with emigration as
a simple consequence of the assumed diminishing returns. How does this
reconcile with the conclusion that the infinitesimal migration does not
affect the welfare of those left behind? The paradox is only apparent:
the emigrant earns, not the per capita income in the pre-migration situation,
but rather the marginal product. The per-capita income comparison, to
be a correct welfare index of the impact on those left behind, would have
to presume that the migrant earned average, rather than marginal, product:
in this case, since the average exceeds the marginal product, the migrant
was contributing less to national income than earning and making demand
on it, so that his migration helps those left behind.*
Model 2 : Two-Product, Two-Factor, One-Factor-Emigration
The extension of the preceding analysis of one-factor-emigration
to the standard trade-theoretic model of two products and two primary
factors has been carried out by Kenan (1971) in the Kindleberger festschrift .
Its substance can be readily derived as follows.
For a closed economy, start with given equilibrium. When labour
migrates inf initesimally, the Rybczynski theorem implies that, at constant
commodity prices, the output of the labour-intensive commodity will fall
and that of the capital-intensive commodity will rise. Since domestic
Income and expenditure fall, however, the assumption of noninferiority
* For those familiar with peasant-family-farming models in the Lewis-type
literature on dualisn, where average product rewards to family members
are assumed, the per-capita income of the farming sector would become the
relevant vel:\ire index. I: ::oe3 not seer, relevant, however, to the problen
of international r.igration.
-8a-
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in consumption, combined with stability, will yield in the post-emigration,
full-equilibrium situation a reduced (relative) commodity price for the
capital-intensive commodity. Next, turn to Figure 2(a) which sketches
the production possibility set of the nonemigrants as AB. In the before-
migration situation, the commodity price-ratio is PC and the welfare
of the nonmigrant group is at U . With the emigration, the commodity
price-ratio shifts, as just argued, to SR and the nonemigrants get worse
off (U, > U ) . It is easy to see the source of this loss: the "trade
b a
opportunity" of the nonmigrants, from the presence of (and with) the
migrants, disappears with the emigration.
Consider now the extension to an open economy. (i) If international
prices are fixed by the "small country" assumption, let PQ = P'Q' be the
given international prices (in Figure 2(b). PP ' is the Rybczynski-line for
changing labour supply. B-efore the migration, the total population has the
production set CD, the nonmigrants have the production set AB, the non-
migrants' welfare is at U and potential emigrants earn income RS in terms
b
of commodity X. \^en migration occurs, the migrants essentially disappear
with their constant marginal product and, at the unchanged commodity price-
ratio, the nonmigrants are left as well off as before (U, = U ) . The
D cL
presence or the absence of the migrant group in the population implies
the same terms of trade, and hence the same trade opportunity, for the
nonmigrants: hence the no-impact result (for infinitesimal and finite
migration) .
If the terms of trade can vary, however, it follows similarly that
the welfare of the nonmigrants will improve or worsen according as the
-9a-
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terms of trade improve or worsen.* In the case illustrated in Figure 2(a),
the nonmigrants export commodity X for commodity Y and the after-migration
improvement in the terms of trade improves their welfare (U" > U,).
Note finally that this strict relationship between the terms of trade
behaviour and the nonemigrants' welfare will not hold for Model I, for
finite emigration, because whereas the emigration at constant prices
Implies in Model II a constant marginal product for labour owing to the
Rybczynski theorem, recall that in the one-good Model I we have a declining
marginal product to labour schedule. Hence, for Model I, we have to set
off the loss of the surplus (CDE in Figure 1) against the terms of trade
gain, if any, to arrive at the net impact of the migration on nonemigrants'
welfare. Thus, in Figure 2(c), OA represents the production possibility
set of the nonemigrants, with specialization throughout on producing X
as required by Model I; AC represents the production attributable to the
potential migrants; and AB represents the surplus (CDE in Figure 1)
that accrues to the nonemigrants. Thus, prior to emigration, with terms
of trade BR, we have nonemigrants' welfare at U, . With the migration,
b
the terms of trade improve to AQ but the surplus is lost so that the
nonmigrants' budget line is now anchored on A rather than B. Figure 2(c)
shows that U, > U , i.e., that the terms of trade gain is outweighed by
b a
the loss of the surplus. The contrary possibility also exists and could
equally well have been illustrated.
* This conclusion naturally holds only insofar as the trade pattern for
the noninigrant group is not reversed by the migration. This qualification,
explicitly noted by Kenen, has its counterpart in our review of the dynanic
analyses where the effects of dissimilar savings behaviour by migrants
and nonmigrants are considered.
-10a-
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Model 3 : One-Product, Two-Factor, Two-Fac tor-Emigration
A different extension of the closed-economy Model 1, retaining the
one-product framework but permitting two factors to emigrate in a two-
factors framework, is due to Johnson (1967). It is derived, in turn,
from the Berry-Soligo paper and is best set out in terms of Figure 3.
Assume two groups: nonemigrants (1) and emigrants (2). The former
group has K and L units of capital and labour whereas the latter has
K and L such units. The overall wage-rental ratio (w/y) is a function
of the overall K/L ratio, k, where K = K + K and L = L + L . In Figure 3,
we then have the post-emigration-of-group-2 equilibrium at Q and ((j,y) is
'^1
the wage-rental ratio tangent to the X isoquant. X is therefore the
post-migration income of group 1. How does this compare with the pre-
migration income level? There are two possibilities to consider but both
show worsening of welfare (except for a singular case of no impact) from
the migration. The entire range of feasible (w/y) ratios before migration
can be divided into (i) the range spanned by QR and QC, which would materialise
clearly if k > k^ (where k^ = K^/L and k = K /L ) and thus k > k ; and (ii)
the range spanned by QS and QD, which would naterialise if k„ < k . The
singular case is where k^ = k, = k and therefore (lj/y), = (u/y), • It
follows irsnediately that, when k^ > k , so that it is the richer group that
emigrates, the wage-to-rental ratio will fall to (u/y), ; in the other case
^1
where k < k , it will rise to (_/y), . In either case, the "budget line"
for group 1 will shrink in the relevant range and will imply loss of income.
To read off this loss of income, all that one has to do, in the case where
k„ > k for example, is to draw the (uj/y), line through Q and take its
tangency with respect to the X, isoquant; clearly, X > y and (X^ - X )
is the loss of income to group 1 from the r:igration of group 2.
-11a-
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It follows equally that the nonemlgrant group 1 will become bfctter off
if the wage-rental ratio rises (falls) when k. > k (k < k ). This can
happen if, when k^ > k^ for example, the emigrants leave sufficient of
their capital behind to raise (instead of lowering) the overall capital-
labour ratio, k, with emigration.
The same conclusions can be readily derived in the context of yet
another familiar diagrammatic technique.* Take Figure 4. It measures
the capital-labour ratios along the horizontal axis to the right and per
capita incomes (y and y^ , overall and group 1 respectively) on the vertical
axis. Writing the aggregate, constant-returns-to-scale production function
in the incentive form as y = f(k), with f > and f" < as usual, we can
easily show that the factor rewards, y and u, in the pre-migration situation
are:
Y = f'(k) = OQ/PO
and 0) = f(k) - kf'(k) = OQ
and therefore
^= PO
so that the wage-rental ratio can be measured as the length of the inter-
cept, on the horizontal axis to the left, of the tangent" to the y = f(k)
*
curve OTT in Figure 3.
*
Now, y = (D(k) + Y(k) • k^ before migration and y^ = u)(k-) + yCk,) • k
after migration. In Figure 3, it is then readily shown that:
* Asim Dasgupta suggested this diagramsacic treatnent to us, independently
of having seen Figure 5 in Section IV, after seeing the prelininary draft
of Section II.
12a-
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* *
^1 = °^1
and
^1 " ^1 "^
"^l*^!
so that the migration leads to a decline in the per capita income of the
*
nonemigrant group 1 by T^T^. As with Figure 3, then, we can also think
of two possibilities: where k < k and k > k . In the latter case as well,
*
if Figure 4 is so redrawn, there will be a measure T^T of per capita
income loss for group 1.*
Finally, note that it should be possible to derive the results of
Model 1 as a special case of Model 3: for. Model 1 is where one may think
of two factors emigrating but with one factor (capital) taking zero value.
With the emigrant group 2 then being labour-abundant, we have the case
where k < k^ and the wage-rental ratio rises after emigration: so we are
in the range (QS - QD) in Figure 3 and in the configuration shown in Figure 4
and, in each instance of course, we get the expected loss of income for
the nonemigrant group 1.
Consider next the extension to an open economy. For the simplest
case (considered by Johnson) of a small country with fixed terms of trade,
and staying within the Samuelson range of incomplete specialization in
production, it is immediately obvious that the emigration of group 2,
>
for k = k , will leave group 1 no better or worse off than before the
migration.
dy^
^^^
* The above results can also be simolv derived bv noting that —— = (k,-k)
-rr;GK i QK.
from this it also follows that, for infinitesimal emigration, the cost of
the emigration to the nonemigrant group goes to zero in the limit and may
virtually be treated as zero.
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Model 4 : One-Product, Three-Factors and Two-Factor Emigration
In his contribution to the Bellagio conference, Grubel (1975) works
with a simple model where skilled workers, unskilled workers and capital
combine to produce a single output and the skilled workers ("engineers")
migrate with the capital embodied in their acquired skills. The main
results of his geometrical analysis are readily derived, while relaxing his
assumption that skilled and unskilled labourers must be used in fixed
proportions, as follows. Thus, consider the system:
L = L + L (2)
e w
K = Kq + kL^ (3)
where 9 is output, L is the number of engineers, L the number of workers,
L the stock of total labour, K the capital stock, k the units of capital
required (i.e., used up) to train an engineer, and K the capital left
over to be employed with L and L to produce output 9.
e w
Assuming that the system will work efficiently so as to maximize out-
put, we can then easily determine the effect of emigration on per capita
income. The implication of the efficiency assumption can be first spelled
out simply by using the envelope theorem. Thus substitute the constraints
(2) and (3) into e(«) :
= 9(K - kL , L , L - L ) (4)
e e e
-15-
For a maximum, it is necessary that:
[e^(-k) + 62 + ^s^-Dl = (5)
where 6. is the ith partial derivative and 1, 2, 3 refer to the first (K^)
,
second (L ) and third (L ) arguments in the function 6(*)-
e w
A: Now, first consider the emigration of unskilled labour. Now:
,„ dL dL dL
^ = e (-k) —^+ a.
-r^+ e.(-i) —^+ S
dL dL dL dL
dL
= [ej^(-k) + e^ + e^(-i)]
-^+83
dL
= e^ (using (5)). (6)
Hence, if unskilled labour emigrates, the loss of national income will be
equal to the marginal product o-f the labour; hence an infinitesimal move
will not harm these left behind. Next, we may examine the impact of the
emigration on per capita incomes:
d(e/L) L(d9 /dL)-8 ®3 1 ,^ 9, ,_,
2
- z— r?""^"
dL L L L L L
As one would intuitively expect, therefore, the per capita product will
rise or fall according as the marginal product to labour (9 ) falls below
or exceeds the average product of labour (9/L)
.
B^: Next, consider the emigration of an engineer, implying the "loss" of
the k units of capital along with a unit of labour.
Therefore, now:
d9 '^^e ^^e^ = 6 (k - k -^) + 6 —- + 6(1 - dL /dL)
dL dL dL
^
i^k + 9^ (using, again, (5)) (8)
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And then:
^^^^= (e, + e,k} -^ (9)
dL -^ L
where, now, the bracketed term includes the marginal product of labour
plus the "lost" marginal product of the capital emigrating via the engineer.
Again, we have the intuitive results on the impact of infinitesimal emigra-
tion of skilled labour on the national income (and hence zero-impact on
those left behind) and on the per capita income of the society.
It is futile to talk of "presumptions" of loss or gain from emigration.
But the weight of the arguments above is that, except for the no-impact
outcome for infinitesimal emigration, the different models seem to lead
to a prima-facie presumption of a loss to these left behind even under
conditions of perfect competition. The magnitude of this loss is of course
conditional on the production functions assumed for the analysis; and
as every undergraduate student of economics now must know, "high" or "low"
costs can emerge depending on whether the elasticity of substitution in
production is assumed to be low or high, in turn.*
* This must be kept in mind by any unsophisticated reader of Johnson's
(1967, App. Ill) illustrative, "small", cost calculations for the Cobb-
Douglas case, even though one is only belabouring the obvious here. It
is perfectly clear that, by assuming a different production function
(e.g. the fixed-coefficients Leontief variety), one can generate "large"
losses. One important implication, again hardly unobvious, is that the
cost of the brain drain could very well vary with the kind of professionals
one is discussing.
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III: Static, Welfare Theorising With Distortions
The theoretical literature embodying distortions, whether policy-
imposed or endogenous (in Bhagwati's (1971) terminology), is rather sparse
although the awareness that such distortions can affect the welfare analysis
of the brain drain is fairly widespread.
The first paper to consider distortions in a systematic, general-
equilibrium framework was by Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). It considers two
distortions: an educational subsidy (which is a policy-imposed distortion)
and a sticky wage (which is an endogenous distortion). The model, in view
of the sticky wage, permits unemployment in the Harris-Todaro (1970) fashion.
At the same time, the model enables the authors to analyse the consequences
of what is aptly called the "emulation" effect: the possibility that
migration of educated labour can raise the sticky wage as the LDC Joneses
emulate and try to keep up with the DC Joneses.
An interesting variation on this model is provided by McCulloch and
Yellen (1975) in their Bellagio paper. They modify the Harris-Todaro
approach so as to enable the sticky wage to respond partially to the degree
of unemployment; at the same time, as in one of the Bhagwati-Hamada (1974)
variants, they assume that all educational costs are privately borne (i.e.,
that there is no policy- imposed distortion via an educational subsidy).*
Both papers lead to more complex welfare analysis than the models
without distortions in Section II. They enable one to consider, for
example, unemployment as an argument in the objective function. Moreover,
* There are other points of difference between the Bhagwati-Hamada and
the McCulloch-Yellen models which the readers can note for themselves:
they are not pertinent to the discussion in the text.
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there is no longer any necessary equality between the income lost to a
country by migration and the wage that the (infinitesimal) migrant earns:
the Grubel-Scott proposition is predictably invalid.
Finally, two important results from this type of analysis may be
noted. First, it is often argued that if only the emigrant paid for the
educational subsidy he had received, that would suffice to leave no adverse
welfare impact on those left behind; the Bhagwati-Hamada analysis—of
the cases where the educational cost is internalized, and where it is
not but the country of immigration compensates the LDC for the educational
cost of the immigrant—shows that this is not a valid conclusion.
Second, there is a school of thought which argues that the emigration
of PTK manpower from LDC's, when there is unemployment, will not harm
the LDC's: that, in fact, we have here an "overflow" or "safety-valve",
rather than a "drain", phenomenon. Graphically, as Walter Adams put it
to the first author of this paper, "I saw doctors driving taxicabs in
Manila; why should we worry about their migrating abroad?" It is clear
from the Bhagwati-Hamada analysis that the emigration, by raising the
expected return to doctors, can cause further expansion of education and
hence lead to loss of income; and that the emulation effect can keep even
actual returns to doctors higher than they might have been, thus reinforcing
the loss in income.
Further, as the Hamada-Bhagwati (1975) analysis at Bellagio models the
point at issue, it is not really meaningful to think of that doctor as
driving taxicabs in Manila forever. He is almost certainly "waiting" to
clear his ECFMG to migrate to the USA. If the possibility of migration to
the USA were not available, he would at some stage stop wasting his skills
-19-
and being a cabdriver and, since returns to being a doctor in Manila are
clearly low, he would migrate internally: to the smaller cities where he
could practice medicine. The external brain drain (from Manila to New
York) therefore inhibits the (desirable) internal diffusion (out of Manila
into the hinterland).* And, even if one pretends that doctors earn the
value of their marginal product (in and out of Manila, in the Philippines),
the above argument shows that the social marginal product of the doctor who
is "unemployed" qua doctor is not zero, contrary to the argument of Dr.
Adams.
In short, the assumption that PTK personnel who are unemployed at
any one point of time can therefore emigrate at no loss of marginal product
to their society is based on the faulty reasoning which assumes that they
will so remain forever and omits taking into account the "search process"
aspect of the labour market. And, it ignores additional welfare implications
which could follow from phenomena such as the Bhagwati-Hamada emulation
effect.**
* The diffusion of doctors from Manila into the hinterland is the slow,
capitalist equivalent of the Maoist policy of "sending" doctors to the
countryside. In India, there is growing evidence that doctors in major
cities now are opening offices in the adjacent towns, visiting there for
periods such as one day a week, thus effectively "migrating" partially
to the hinterland: flirting is easier than marriage!
** The precise implications of building these interpretations of unemploy-
ment into the model used for analyzing the effects of brain drain will
depend, of course, on how the rest of the model is put together. This
should be obvious to the reader from contrasting the analyses in, say,
Bhagwati-Hamada (1974), McCulloch-Yellen (1975) and Hamada-Bhagwati (1975).
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IV: Dynamic Analyses of International Migration
The dynamic treatment of the consequences of migration, whether
unskilled or skilled. Is more recent; besides the number of contributions
In this framework is yec relatively small.
The dynamic models naturally divide Into those which concentrate,
on steady state analysis, such as Berry and Sollgo (1969), McCulloch and
Yellen (197A) and Rodriguez (1975a), and those which additionally or
exclusively describe the transition of the economy outside the steady
state, as in Mlshan and Needleman (1968) and Rodriguez (1975b)
.
At the sane time, their common dynamic feature is the explicit intro-
duction of capital as a factor of production and the ability of the economy
to change the level of Its capital stock by means of savings, domestic
or foreign. Furthermore, the papers addressed to the brain drain, as
distinct from what might be called Ricardian labour migration of the purely
unskilled variety, incorporate a second produced factor of production:
i.e., education as human capital. Moreover, all the papers reviewed focus,
not on world-welfare effects, but on the welfare Implications of the
migration on the nonmigrant populations of the countries of immigration
or emigration. Finally, in regard to the measures of welfare changes,
the most widely used are the per-capita income of native residents together
with the relative factor rewards as indicators of the income distribution,
although Berry-Soligo and Rodriguez (1975a) follow a utilitarian approach
and proceed to evaluate the full changes in the levels of utility enjoyed,
the former by means of consumer surplus analysis and the latter by the
first-order change in the stationary level of utility enjoyed by each
Individual in the context of a life-cycle model of savings.*
* In none of the dynamic models either, therefore, is the issue of to-and-
fro migration addressed: emigrants leave for good and the welfare of
those left behind is what is considered.
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Finally, we must note that, in contrast to the static analyses reviewed
in earlier sections, labour mobility in a dynamic context can be analyzed
(a) as a once-and-for-all labor movement or instead (b) as a rate of migra-
tion per unit of time which may, in turn, be either constant or varying
over time according to the changing domestic or foreign conditions.
In Case (a), it is clear that a once-and-for-all labor movement will
not affect any of the steady state values of the relevant per-capita variables
provided we assume that migrants have the same preferences as those of
the indigenous population. Under those circumstances, the labor movement
can be considered as a change in one of the initial conditions (i.e.,
initial population) such that the steady state of the economy (if it exists)
will be unaffected by it. If however a steady state does not exist (as
in one of the cases discussed by Mishan-Needleman because of their inclusion
of Hicks-neutral technological progress in a Solow-type growth model) even
a once-and-for-all inflow of labor with the same preferences as the in-
digenous population will have permanent effects on the long-run paths of
the per-capita variables. When migrants have different preferences from
those of the rest, however, even a once-and-for-all migration will change
the preference structure of the population and will thus have both short-
and long-run effects (provided, of course, that those preferences are
transmitted to their children) on the economy. With the exception of
McCulloch-Yellen (1974) and Mishan-Needleman, all the other articles re-
viewed here introduce differences in preferences in one way or another.
In Case (b), where migration is a continuous process through time,
we have again to distinguish between two different problems: (^-i) ^
constant or variable migration rate will change the rate of population
growth and thus the steady state requirements of per-capita savings,
I
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and (b„) the preferences of the migrants may differ from those of the
rest. In either case it is clear that a continuous migration process
will affect both the transition and the steady state behaviour of the
economy.
(A); The dynamic models of Ricardian labor migration
This subsection concentrates on the models that treat labour as a
homogeneous input (contrary to those, discussed in the next subsection,
which additionally consider skilled labour)
.
(a) Of the analyses treating international migration in a dynamic
context, the Mishan-Needleman paper is probably the one which provides
the clearest link between the static and dynamic models. Their production
structure is the same as that of the Solow-type growth model: one-sector
neoclassical technology with two inputs, capital and labor. Savings
(equated to investment) are a constant fraction of income and population
reproduces at a constant exponential rate. Immigrants have the same
preferences (i.e., savings ratio) as the natives and are assumed to enter
the country of immigration in a constant number per year. After the
immigrant group of a given year enters the country, it starts reproducing
itself at the same exponential rate as the natives. Since one of the
main objectives of the analysis is to investigate the effects of immigration
on the welfare of the indigenous population, they incorporate those born
to the immigrants (i.e., their descendants) into the stock of the immigrant
population.*
* Again, there is scope here for debate. Even where the immigrant may
be treated as different from the country of immigration, would it not
be more drastic to assume that those born of first-generation imnigrants
will still be "second-class" citizens for ever (and ever, in the unfolding
of our dynamic model)?
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These simple assumptions provide an ideal framework to test in a
dynamic model the static propositions that a discrete labor inflow (outflow)
will decrease (increase) aggregate per-capita income but raise (reduce)
the per-capita income of those who were previously in the country (left
behind). In this case, of course, the focus of analysis is on the time-paths
of the different measures of per-capita income.
Mishan and Needleman do not solve explicitly their model in order
to find out the qualitative properties of the growth path but rather they
postulate a CES production function and, using various sets of parameters
values presumably appropriate to the UK, they proceed to simulate the paths
of the relevant variables for a thirty-year horizon. Some of their results
seem to confirm those of the static analysis: for all of the 30 years
aggregate income per-capita falls short of that under no immigration while
the wage-rental ratio is consistently lower under the immigration regime.
However, their results for the effects on the per-capita income of the
indigenous population do, in some cases (notably, when the production
function is Cobb-Douglas), differ from what would be expected: in the
Cobb-Douglas case the per-capita income of the indigenous population falls
short (instead of being in excess) of that under no immigration for the
first 21 years. This seems an unusual conclusion in the light of the
neoclassical nature of the assumptions. We think however that a possible
explanation for that lies in their treatment of overhead capital. They
assume that a constant fraction of total savings is required for the
formation of overhead capital which is not directly productive; although
in the text they assume that such savings are provided by the immigrants,
the equations that they simulate do not show it but rather imply that the
immigrants' savings for overhead capital are provided by the indigenous
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population at the expense of their own accumulation of physical capital,
which of course tends to reduce their own per-capita income (see their
eqns. 13 and 18). Furthermore, the moment the immigrant settles in the
country, there is an additional requirement for overhead capital which
is assumed to be provided by the indigenous population.
Abstracting from the formation of overhead capital and their assumption
of a positive constant rate of technical progress, the effects of a once-
and-for-all immigrant inflow in the Mishan-Needleman model can be described,
in a perhaps more illuminating way, as follows.
Let Q = F(K,L) = L f(k) be the neoclassical production function for
the composite good Q which can be either consumed or transformed into
physical capital. The total labor force can be divided into that of
indigenous origin, L,, and that of immigrant origin, L . Since both
d m
immigrants and indigenous residents have the same savings ratio, the
capital-labor ratio of the economy changes through time according to the
standard formula:
k = s-f(k) - n-k (10)
where n is the rate of population growth. At time t , when the once-
o
and-for-all irTiigration takes place, there is a jump in the capital-labor
ratio from k = K(t )/L^(t ) to k, = K(t )/{L^(t )+L (t )}, where L (t )
o odo 1 odomo mo
is the size of the immigrant inflow. From t on, immigration ceases but
the initial immigrant population starts reproducing itself at the rate n,
while at the same time they save the same fraction of their income as the
rest of the population. In consequence, the capital- labor ratio of the
economy, after the initial jump at t , starts changing through tine according
to (10).
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The amount of capital per-head owned by the immigrant population then
changes according to:
(2) k^ = s-y - n-k (11)m m m
where y is the per-capita income of the immigrant population and equals
m
the sum of their wage earnings, u(k), plus the earnings from the capital
they own, Y(k)k . Notice that, given competition and constant returns
m
to scale, the wage rate and the rental rate, u and y> are functions only
of the economy's aggregate capital-labor ratio, k. In Figure 5, per-capita
income and savings are represented on the vertical axis and ratios of capital
to population on the horizontal axis. The curve q = f(k) shows the aggre-
gate per-capita income as a function of the aggregate capital-labor ratio;
the curve nk shows the steady state investment requirements; and finally
the curve sf(k) shows the aggregate per-capita savings.
We assume that, before the immigration, the economy had reached the
steady state level of the capital-labor ratio k . After the immigration,
the capital-labor ratio falls instantaneously to k and aggregate income
per-capita consequently falls to k B from the higher level k D. The reduction
in the capital-labor ratio increases the rental rate and reduces the wage
rate (which is now given by the distance OA along the vertical axis). Since
initially immigrants have no capital, their income is equal to the wage
rate, OA, clearly lower than the aggregate per-capita income which also
includes the earnings from the capital stock. Even though the aggregate
capital-labor ratio has been reduced, the per-capita amount of capital
owned by the indigenous population remains unchanged at k . Thus, the per-
capita income of the indigenous population immediately after the immigrant
-25a-
q = f(k)
Figure 5
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inflow is equal to the new wage rate, OA, plus the rental rate (the slope
of the line AC) times their per-capita holdings of capital, or the distance
k C which exceeds the per-capita income they had before the immigration
by the amount CD. Thus, the short-run effect of immigration is to raise
the per-capita income of the indigenous population.*
Following the impact effect, it is clear that for the new capital-
labor ratio, k , aggregate savings exceed the amount of investment required
to keep it at the same level and thus it will start rising, according
to eq. (10), until eventually it will approach back the pre-immigration
steady state value k . There are thus no long-run effects on the aggregate
per-capita income or capital-labor ratio from a once-and-for-all immigrant
inflow. Initially, however, the per-capita income of the indigenous
population has been increased above the original steady state level;
thus, their per-capita savings will exceed the amount required to keep
the amount of capital per-head they own constant. In consequence, the
ratio of capital-per-head owned by the indigenous population, k , will
start rising. It is clear that during the transition process for which
k < k it will also be k, > k and thus the per-capita income of the indigenous
o do
residents will exceed its pre-immigration steady state value. Eventually,
however, the aggregate capital-labor ratio will approach k and remain
there. At this moment, k, may be also equal to k or still larger. If
d o
it is equal, the income per-capita of the indigenous population will be
the same as the aggregate per-capita income and thus k, will behave in
d
the same way as k and will remain constant. If k, still exceeds k
d o
while k = k , then k must be falling and finally approaching k : for
* The reader may profitably recall here our analysis of Figure 3.
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the set of factor rewards implied by k = k , any k larger than k implies
that the per-capita savings of the indigenous residents fail short of the
investment required to keep it constant. For example, for k = k and
o
k, = k„ > k
,
per capita savings of the indigenous population are k„F
d 2 o Z
(the line EF is tangent to the function sf(k ) at the point k ; thus the
o o
slope of the line is sr(k )) while the steady state investment requirements
are Gk„, which clearly exceed k F; thus, k must be falling and eventually
approaching the pre- immigration level k .
To conclude, following a once-and-for-all inflow of foreign labor
into the country, the basic assumptions of the Mishan-Needleman model
imply that the income per-capita of the indigenous population will be
raised above the pre- immigration level and remain above it during all the
transition period until the economy reaches again the pre-immigration steady
state level for all per-capita variables.
(b) To the extent that the assumption of equal tastes helped to rule
out any steady state effects of migration, the most natural extension
at this point is to inquire about the nature of steady state effects when
the preferences of migrants differ from those of the rest (in particular,
when the saving ratios differ). As it happens, this is precisely the
question addressed by Berry-Soligo (1969) and Rodriguez (1975a), to whose
analysis we now turn.
Both papers differ from Mishan-Needleman in at least two basic respects:
(i) Savings behavior is derived from the individual's maximization of life-
time utility. This, in general, implies that the saving ratios are not
constant but rather depend on factor rewards. Individuals do not all have
the same utility function.
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(ii) Both papers are concerned with the effects of emigration on the welfare
of those left behind rather than on the effects of immigration on the
welfare of the indigenous population of the receiving country; it is obvious,
however, that both questions are different sides of the same coin.
Basically, their behavioral assumption is that of a life cycle model
of savings where individuals work when they are young and save for their
retirement. In this context, the interest rate not only plays the role
of being the return to the factor of production "capital" but also deter-
mines the trade-off between present (working period) and future (retirement
period) consumption. As proved elsewhere (Samuelson (1958), Diamond (1965)),
a competitive market will in general fail to attain the optimal "golden
rule" level of the capital-labor ratio (for which the interest rate equals
the rate of population growth) at which society's consumption potential
is maximized and the optimal distribution of consumption among generations
is attained. To the extent therefore that emigration or immigration changes
the aggregate savings ratio of the population and thus the steady state
level of the capital-labor ratio, there can be aggregate social gains or
losses depending on whether the move is towards or away the golden rule
level of the capital-labor ratio.
For the members of each individual group (characterized by a set of
preferences) these aggregate gains or losses must be modified to the extent
that the individual differs from the average: the change in the steady
state capital-labor ratio brings about changes in relative factor rewards
which in turn redistribute income in favor of the group which is relatively
better endowed with the factor whose reward has increased in relative terns.
For example, if there are only two groups of individuals, high savers and
I
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low savers, emigration of some members of the high-savers group will in
general reduce the new steady state capital-labor ratio (through the reduction
in the aggregate savings ratio of the population) . If the capital-labor
ratio was initially below its golden rule level (i.e., the interest rate
was larger than the rate of population growth), this move must decrease
welfare in the aggregate. The lower capital intensity, in turn, decreases
the wage-rental ratio and thus redistributes income towards those remaining
members of the high-savers group (those with a higher preference for the
ownership of capital) and away from the low savers. It follows that, on
both counts, the members of the low-savings group tend to be worse off
while the remaining members of the high savings group may be either worse
off or better off. When low savers emigrate, the capital-labor ratio will
be increased and, if the movement is towards the golden rule ratio, there
is a gain in the aggregate and a redistribution of income towards the remaining
low savers (the wage-rental ratio rises). Thus, on both counts, the re-
maining low savers are better off while the effect on high savers is ambiguous.
It follows from the above analysis that if the capital-labor ratio
is below its golden rule level, in the long run emigration of high savers
(which decreases the capital-labor ratio even further) will make at least
one group worse off while emigration of low savers will make at least
one group better off. If, however, the capital-labor ratio was above the
golden rule level, those conclusions should be reversed since in this
case reductions in the capital-labor ratio are beneficial in the aggregate.
(c) To summarize, in this section we have concentrated on the description
of dynamic models of labor migration where migrants may or may not differ
from the rest of the population in regard to their preferences for the
accumulation of physical capital. If everyone's preferences are identical
and migration is a once-and-for-all phenomenon, there are in general no
steady state effects of migration; the gains of the population of the
receiving country (or losses to those remaining in the country of origin)
which appear in the static models do also appear in this case, except that
these gains (or losses) occur in the transitional period during which
the economy approaches the original steady state. These transitional gains
or losses are shown to depend critically on the per-capita ownership of
capital by the economic agents and the transitional change in the economy's
factor proportions (and factor rewards) brought about by the migration.
When migrants differ from the rest of the population in their savings
habits, we have, not merely the transitional gains or losses referred to
above, but also the permanent changes in the steady state of the economy
due to the now-different aggregate savings behavior. These effects can
be divided into two parts: (i) effects of movements in the steady state
capital-labor ratio towards or away from the golden rule ratio, and (ii)
effects of changes in the steady state distribution of income due to the
new prevailing set of factor rewards and the different preferences of
members of the population for the ownership of factors of production.
(B) : The dynamic models of the brain drain
We turn next to the brain drain models whose basic feature is that,
in addition to unskilled labor and physical capital, human capital appears
as a distinctive factor of production. Human capital is assumed to be
accumulated through an educational process which uses up some of society's
scarce resources.
To the extent that competition prevails everywhere, including the
educational carket, it is clear that allowing for the international mobilit}
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of educated people amounts to little more than an extension of the issues
discussed in the previous section to the context of a three-factor model.
Neither of the two papers in this area, McCulloch-Yellen (1974) and
Rodriguez (1975b), however, could be described as a straightforward three-
factor extension of the models analyzed so far. The main differences
are:
(i) The educational market is not assumed to be perfect, either because
education is not competitively supplied or because, thanks to the existence
of capital market imperfections or information costs, the rates of return
to physical and human capital are not equalized.
(ii) Rather than considering an exogenous population movement or
migration rate, the two papers consider as exogenous the foreign rewards
of the internationally mobile factors and the migration preferences of
those factors in response to the rates of return from international emigra-
tion. Since these rates of return depend not only on the foreign rewards
but also on the domestic rewards and the costs of the move, it follows
that the actual migration rates will be endogenously determined within
the system.
(iii) The Rodriguez (1975b) analysis also includes the case of labor
market distortions of the type analyzed in Harris-Todaro (1970) which were
also discussed in a static framework in Bhagwati-Hamada (1974) and Hamada-
Bhagwati (1975).
The paper which most closely approximates the other dynamic models
previously discussed is McCulloch-Yellen (1974) which concentrates on the
study of the steady state effects on the distribution of income of migration
of educated (skilled) people within the context of the following basic
assumptions:
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(i) Only one good is produced with a constant-returns-to-scale
technology and three factors: physical capital, skilled (educated) and
unskilled labor.
(ii) Education (the acquisition of skills) is carried on until the
point where the skilled-unskilled wage differential equals the cost of
acquiring the education which, in turn, increases with the fraction of the
newly-born population getting educated. The educational cost may be either
the marginal or average cost depending on the kind of market structure
which prevails in this sector. For the purposes of making the comparison,
they convert the once-and-for-all education cost into a constant flow per
time unit, using an exogenously given discount rate.
(iii) Migration is carried on until the foreign-domestic wage differential
for skilled labor equals the flow-equivalent migration cost. Unskilled
labor does not migrate.
(iv) The domestic rate of return on physical capital is equalized with
the foreign rate of return by assuming perfect international mobility of
foreign capital at constant rental. The accumulation of capital over time
is exclusively from foreign savings: there is no domestic generation of
savings.
Given these assumptions and a constant rate of population growth,
the result is, in general, a nonzero migration rate for skilled labor.
This is so because there is no reason why the steady state output of the
educational sector will be consistent with the maintenance of that particular
stock of skilled labor relative to the other factors which precisely generates
a domestic skilled wage such that emigration or immigration is not attractive.
There is however a band equal to the foreign skilled wage plus or minus
the migration cost such that if the steady state domestic skilled *age
falls within it, no migration will occur.
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The steady state factor rewards for skilled and unskilled labor,
migration rate and education rate will then depend on certain exogenous
parameters, among them the foreign wage for skilled labor, the foreign
rental on capital, the migration cost and the interest rate used for dis-
counting investments in human capital or migration. In fact, reduced
to its barest essentials, the basic assumptions of this model imply the
following steady state relationships. Assuming that the steady state is
consistent with net emigration of skilled labor (a similar analysis follows
easily in the case of immigration), the domestic skilled wage is pegged
at the world level minus the migration cost (converted into a constant-flow
equivalent). The thus-determined skilled wage plus constant rental on
capital (equal to the world rental) suffice to determine all the steady
state factor proportions in production (the ratios of capital to skilled
and unskilled labor) and, by implication therefore, the unskilled wage
and also the skilled-unskilled wage differential. The wage differential,
in turn, determines the fraction of the newly-born population acquiring
education via assumption (ii) above. Since for a steady state the growth
rate of the skilled labor force must equal that of the total labor force
(such that factor proportions remain constant) , the equilibrium migration
rate is then obtained as the difference between the growth rate in the stock
of skilled people, implied by the already-determined equilibrium factor
proportions and the fraction of those newly-born getting educated, and
the rate of population growth.*
* Denote by S,U and P = S+U the skilled, unskilled and total population,
by g and e the gross rate of population growth and the fraction of those
just born getting education, and finally by m the ratio of skilled migrants
to total population. Then, the growth rates in the stocks of skilled labor
and total population are:
(l/S)(dS/dt) = (eg-m)(P/S)
,
(l/P)(dP/dt) = g - m .
Since both growth rates must be equal in the steady state, the equilibrium
migration rate will be given by:
m = g(l-e)(S/U) - ge
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From these relatively simple relationships it is then easy to derive
the steady state responses of several endogenous variables to changes
in the exogenous parameters. For example, an increase in the cost of
emigration (or equivalently, an emigration tax or a fall in the foreign
skilled wage) reduces the domestic skilled wage by the same amount.
Given the constant rental on capital and the constant-returns-to-scale
technology, reductions in the skilled wage are associated with increases
in the unskilled wage; thus the skilled-unskilled wage differential must
unambiguously fall. The fall in the skilled-unskilled wage ratio makes
skilled labor more attractive to use in production than unskilled labor
and thus the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is increased. Similarly,
the lower wage differential makes education less attractive and thus the
fraction of the newly-born getting educated falls. The lower output of the
educational sector plus the higher steady state requirement of skilled
labor relative to the unskilled unambiguously implies a reduction in the
rate of emigration.
The only other, dynamic analysis of skilled migration is by Rodriguez
(1975b). It concentrates on the differential attitudes of individuals
regarding the decisions of capital accumulation, education and migration.
Rather than postulating that education is carried on by everyone up to
the point where the wage differential equals the (flow-equivalent) education
cost, he assumes that all those born to educated (skilled) parents will
get educated irrespective of costs and returns (at least within the relevant
range) while only a fraction of those born to uneducated parents will seek
education, this fraction depending on the pecuniary rate of return to educa-
tion. Similarly, migration does not necessarily close the gap between
foreign and domestic wages (allowing for the migration cost) but rather
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the fraction of the skilled population which chooses to migrate is assumed
to be a function of the rate of return to such a move. It is further
assumed that investment in physical capital is a constant fraction of
profits earned. On the technology side, he assumes two sectors whose
outputs are traded at a fixed international relative price as in Bhagwati-
Hamada (1974) and McCulloch-Yellen (1975) but, and in contrast to both,
physical capital is used in both sectors while only one type of labor (skilled
or unskilled) is used in each sector. The mobility of capital between
the sectors and the fixed terms of trade imply a technologically-determined
positive relationship between the returns to both kinds of labor. This
makes the income distribution predictions of this model essentially different
from those of McCulloch-Yellen (1974) where the assumptions about technology
and international mobility of capital implied a negative relationship be-
tween the skilled and unskilled wage rates. Education is assumed to be
supplied by a third sector at a constant cost and capital goods are assumed
to be imported from abroad or produced in one of the two domestic sectors.
The paper analyzes the stability of the model, the nature of the steady
state solution and comparative statics, proceeding then a la Bhagwati-
Hamada to analyze the long-run effects of sticky real wages in the context
of a Harris-Todaro (1970) labor market while exploring also the short-
and long-run effects of the implementation of a migration tax on factor
rewards and unemployment.
When wages are flexible, the more distinctive result of the model
is the complete independence of all steady state factor rewards from the
costs of migration or the foreign wage and thus also from a migration tax.
The reason for this result can be easily shown as follows: Denote by x
the fraction of those born to unskilled parents who get educated, n the
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growth rate of population, U and K the stocks of unskilled labor and capital,
and s and r the savings ratio out of profits and the interest rate respectively.
Then, the growth rate in the stock of the unskilled population equals:
(l/U)(dU/dt) = n(l-x)
, (12)
and the growth rate in the stock of capital is:
(l/K)(dK/dt) = s-r . (13)
In the steady state, both these growth rates must be equalized and thus,
in the steady state, we must have:
S'r = n(l-x) - (14)
Since x depends only on the constant education cost and the skilled-unskilled
wage differential which, in turn, depends only on the interest rate (r)
,
it follows that the above condition determines by itself the steady state
interest rate and, by implication, all other factor rewards as function only
of the educational cost, s and n. Since none of these three variables
depends in any way on the foreign wage or the migration cost, it follows
that steady state factor rewards are independent of these two variables.
Notice, however, that if workers were also to save, the rate of growth of
the capital stock would also depend on their savings ratio and the shares
of the different factors in national income. Since these shares will
depend on the ratios of the different factor endowments (which are endogenous
variables in the steady state), the above steady state condition would
not suffice to determine all factor rewards which will now depend also
on the other parameters of the system, including the foreign wage and the
migration cost.
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As for the short run, Rodriguez returns to the original assumptions,
showing that the steady state independence of factor rewards from a migration
tax does not prevail in the short run and that, following the imposition
of such a tax, the returns to both types of labor will fall during the
transitional period while the return to capital is increased.
In conclusion, Rodriguez notes for the sticky-wage variant of his
model that, with this amendment, it is rather the long-run rate of unemploy-
ment that is independent from the foreign wage or the migration cost.
However, in the transitional period, following an increase in the migration
cost, the unemployment rate is increased; note however that, since Rodriguez
shows that the model is always unstable when there is a minimum wage for
skilled labor, this result strictly applies only to unskilled wages and
unskilled unemployment.
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V: Concluding Remarks
Clearly, the preceding review suggests that the theoretical analysis
of the brain drain, once dormant after the Grubel-Scott-Berry-Soligo-
Johnson phase, has received a fresh lease of life with the analysis of
distortions (beginning with Bhagwati-Hamada) and of explicitly dynamic
formulations (in Rodriguez). The explicit examination of policy options,
in general-equilibrium formulation, is also recent: especially, the
Bhagwati-type surtax on migrants has been examined, for its welfare impact,
in several of the recent papers.
Where can we suggest fruitful avenues for future theoretical work?
The following would seem to be rewarding areas for general-equilibrium
analysis:
(i) the welfare of the nonemigrants may be examined for to-and-fro
migration (as noted earlier) by permitting the migrant to acquire skills,
wealth, etc. during the migration to the DC's;
(ii) the case of the migration accentuating distortions (e.g. through
the emulation effect in Bhagwati-Hamada) may be extended to the case where
migration reduces distortions (e.g. if a state monopsony is under-remunerating
the emigrants' skills, the migration could reduce the monopsonistic power);
and
(iii) the possibility that the migration could affect the foreign
trade possibilities (i.e., the foreign offer curve) via its effect on the
LDC's overall national income and hence on its bargaining power in a world
of unequal partners or via the efforts exerted by the migrants in their
DC's of destination on behalf of their LDC's of origin (e.g. Greek PTK
emigrants influencing the U.S. Congress in favour of Greece in matters of
importance to Greece), may also be formalised.
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